Abstract-This paper analyzes the disclosure policies of critical infrastructures under the threat of terrorism by use of subjective game theory. A terror risk of critical infrastructures depends on terrorists' motive to attack them. Therefore, it is expected that the proper implementation of protection and disclosure about critical infrastructures can contribute to the reduction of terror risk.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates disclosure policies of critical infrastructures such as power plants, transportation and water supply facilities under threat of terrorism. It is seriously needed to contemplate the countermeasures against terror attacks because the malfunction of such infrastructures may cause enormously social and economic impacts. Unlike natural disaster risks, a terror risk depends on terrorists' capability and motive to attack targets. Therefore, the disclosure policy is considered as one of the important policies which mitigate terror risk because it may affect the decision making of persons or organizations that have a motive to attack public targets. The implementation of proper disclosure policy may give terrorists pause to attack targets. It is expected to lessen the damage of terror attacks by the implementation of proper protections and disclosures on critical infrastructures.
Historically, the security issues of critical infrastructures are discussed by limited experts, and the detailed discussions are implicitly supposed not to be open to the public. Terrorists can review their strategy of terror attacks by use of information disclosed by the government; consequently they may be able to make their strategy of terror attack more successful. Therefore, in most countries, the information about security issues of critical infrastructures has been dealt as classified information by the government. However, it is not always true that all of the information of critical infrastructures should not open to the public. The government should proactively adopt the disclosure policy which can contribute to the reduction of terror risk.
Against such a background, this paper analyzes the disclosure policies about 1) the government's warning level of terror risk, and 2) the implementation of protective countermeasure under the assumption of naive government. The naive government is a virtual figure of the government that does not regard the threat of terrorism as the actual threat, and does not take any countermeasures against terror attacks. This paper assumes that the figure of the naive government is common knowledge between the government and the terrorist at the initial stage. On the basis of this assumption, this paper develops the disclosure policies which can reduce terror risk of critical infrastructures.
In section 2, the basic framework of analysis is shown. Section 3 shows the basic model where the government and the terrorist share common knowledge of naive government. Section 4 analyzes the effectiveness of the disclosure policy about the government's warning level. Section 5 analyzes the effectiveness of the disclosure policy about the implementation of protective countermeasure. It is shown that both the disclosure policies are effective with respect to the reduction of terror risk, and the latter policy can reduce more terror risk than the former policy.
II. BASIC FRAMEWORK
There exist preceding researches dealing with the strategic relationship between a government and a terrorist with game theory [1] − [8] . For example, Sandler et al. [1] analyzed the mechanism of overinvestment and underinvestment for the anti-terrorism countermeasure under two targets. Powell [2] showed that the expected damage can be minimized by uniform investment for the countermeasures, independent of the vulnerabilities of targets. In addition, Bier et al. [3] formulated the simultaneous-move game in case with the government's disclosure about protective countermeasure and the sequentialmove game in case without the government's disclosure, and showed the expected damage is always small in case with the disclosure. There exist a lot of other researches using game theory to analyze their strategic relationships; however, it is noted that the analyses are conducted under some assumptions. These researches uses the traditional equilibrium concepts such as Nash [9] and Bayesian equilibrium [10] . When these concepts are applied, it is assumed that each player has complete detailed information about the identity of his opponents, their feasible sets, information structures, utilities, and so forth [11] . In addition, when such information is missing, the player assigns correct prior probabilities to all possible values of the unknown parameters. Each player assumes that his opponents model the game exactly as he does and, moreover, that they too assign the same correct prior probabilities to all unknown parameters. The suggestive policies to reduce terror risk can be induced under these assumptions; however, it is clear that the assumptions are not satisfied between the government and the terrorist. The government does not know what targets and how the terrorist attacks. What is worse, the government confronts the uncertainty of the very existence of the terrorist. Similarly, the terrorist does not know the condition of critical infrastructures because most information of critical infrastructure is dealt as classified information. Relaxing these strict assumptions, this paper analyzes the strategic relationship between the government and the terrorist by use of subjective game theory. It is assumed that the government and the terrorist formulate the subjective game, respectively, and decide their strategy on the basis of each game. The game that the government plays does not coincide with the one that the terrorist plays. Under such a situation, the important role of the government's disclosure is to associate the government's subjective game with the terrorist's subjective game.
In addition, this paper assumes the common knowledge of naive government. The War on Terror is an international military campaign led by the United States and the United Kingdom after Sept. 11 terrorism attack. However, countries which have few experiences of permanent relations with terror groups do not regard the terrorism as a real risk which threatens their society. People in such countries share popular belief that terror attacks will not happen in their countries. The government and the people does not make consensus on proper level of the protection about critical infrastructures. To reflect such a situation, this paper introduces the assumption of common knowledge of naive government. The government and the terrorist have a common knowledge that the government expects no existence of the terrorist, and does not take any countermeasures against terror attacks. This paper clarifies the role of the disclosure policies about 1) the government's warning level, and 2) the implementation of protective countermeasure on the basis of common knowledge of naive government.
III. THE BASIC MODEL

A. Preliminary Settings
Let us consider the situation where a government manages one infrastructure. The government develops a strategy of how
Notes) The dashed area is not played by the terrorist under the assumption of naive government (q = 0).
Fig. 2. The terrorist's subjective game Γ T
to protect the critical infrastructure from terror attacks. The government forms a belief p ∈ [0, 1] about the existence of the terrorist. The formed belief p is private information of the government. When the government forms the belief p which is closer to 1, the government is more convinced the existence of the terrorist. On the other hand, when the government forms the belief p which is closer to 0, the government are not very cautious about the threat of terrorism.
For the following analysis, it is assumed that the government and the terrorist have common knowledge of naive government. The terrorist expects that the government does not consider the existence of the terrorist and does not take a protective countermeasure for the critical infrastructure. The terrorist's expectation to the government's belief p is represented as q, and q = 0 is assumed at the initial stage of the analysis. In addition, q is regarded as the terrorist's belief about social cognition of the existence. q = 1 means that the terrorist expects that the terrorist's existence is completely open to the public; on the other hand, q = 0 means that the terrorist completely believes that the terrorist succeeds in the concealment of the existence. The assumption of naive government implies that the fact that the terrorist forms the belief q = 0 is common knowledge between the government and the terrorist.
For the strategy of the terrorist, let us define the terrorist's strategy in the subjective game Γ j (j ∈ {G, T }) as s j ∈ [0, 1]. s j = 1 means that the terrorist attacks the infrastructure and s j = 0 means that the terrorist does not. The subscript G represents the government's subjective game and the subscript T represents the terrorist's subjective game. For simplicity, it is assumed that the terrorist's strategy set is as same as the one which the government expects. When the terrorist decides to attack, the terrorist burdens the cost I. The terrorist gains the benefit U in case where the attack succeeds, but the terrorist bear the cost D in case of attack failure. In addition, let us define the government's strategy as δ j ∈ [0, 1]. δ j = 1 means that the government takes a protective countermeasure against terror attacks, and δ j = 0 means that the government does not. Similarly, the strategy set of the government is as same as the one the terrorist expects. When the government takes the protective countermeasure, the government bears the cost c. By taking the protective countermeasure, the government can reduce the probability of malfunction of the infrastructure caused by the terror attack from 1 to r (0 < r < 1). The government bears the social damage L by the mulfunction of the infrastructure. Fig.1 represents the subjective game Γ G played by the government and Fig.2 represents the subjective game Γ T played by the terrorist. The government makes a decision on the basis of Γ G which represents the government's expectation to the strategic relationship between the government and the terrorist. The terrorist also selects the strategy of the terror attack on the basis of Γ T .
For the parameter settings, it is assumed that
wherer = 1 − r. This assumption implies that if the terrorist exists and attacks the infrastructure for sure, the government can benefit by taking the protective countermeasure. In addition, the terrorist's payoff is assumed to be satisfied
The assumption implies that when the government does not take the countermeasure, the terrorist gains the positive payoff by attacking the infrastructure. Moreover,
is assumed. This assumption implies that when the government takes the protective countermeasure, the expected payoff of the terrorist is negative. (2) and (3) are the conditions to guarantee that the government has a motive to take the protective countermeasure and the terrorist has a motive to attack the infrastructure.
B. Subjective Game Played by the Terrorist Γ T
The terrorist selects the strategy on the basis of the subjective game Γ T which represents the terrorist's expectation to the strategic relationship between the government and the terrorist. Under the assumption of naive government, the terrorist expects that the government expects that the probability of the terrorist's existence is equal to zero. Therefore, the decision making of the government, which the terrorist expects, is formulated as
The terrorist selects the strategy of terror attack in consideration of the expectation of the government's strategy. The terrorist's decision making is formulated as
From (2), the equilibrium of the terrorist's subjective game
That is, the terrorist always expects that the government does not take the countermeasure; consequently, the terrorist always decides to attack the infrastructure.
C. Subjective Game Played by the Government Γ G
In the government's subjective game Γ G , the government considers that if the terrorist exists, the terrorist assumes that the government is naive. In the subjective game Γ G , the optimal strategy of the terrorist s * G is induced by
Under the assumption of naive government, the government expects that the terrorist always attack the infrastructure if the terrorist exists. But the government confronts an uncertainty of the terrorist's existence and forms a belief p about the terrorist's existence. The optimal strategy of the government δ * G is induced by
whereδ G = 1 − δ G The government's optimal strategy about the protective countermeasure is represented as follows.
The government expects that the terrorist always attacks the infrastructure. Meanwhile, the government's selection of the strategy about the protective countermeasure depends on the belief p. When the government forms the high belief, the government takes the countermeasure; on the other hand, when the government forms the low belief, the government does not.
D. Overall Equilibria of the Basic Game
The government and the terrorist select their strategy on the basis of each subjective game which they formulate respectively. In the basic model, they have no communication about the strategy, payoff, and the structure of the game. Let (δ * G , s * T ) be the overall equilibrium of the two subjective games, and V G (δ * G , s * T ) be the government's expected payoff on the basis of the belief p. Then, they are represented as follows. Fig. 3 . The government's subjective game considering the dislosure policy of warning level Γ B G Case 1 represents the situation where the government forms a high belief on the terrorist's existence. Then, the government, that regards terrorism as an actual risk which threatens the infrastructure, decides to protect the infrastructure. The terrorist decides to attack it while expecting the naive government. Case 2 deals with the government that forms a lower belief on the terrorist's existence. Then, the government does not protect the infrastructure from terror attacks, and the terrorist attacks it. The terrorist's strategy is always to attack the infrastructure, although the government's decision making depends on the belief p. Under the assumption of common knowledge of naive government, if the terrorist has no way of knowing whether the infrastructure is protected, the terrorist always decides to attack the infrastructure.
The assumption of common knowledge of naive government implies that the government and the terrorist share the recognition that the terrorist makes a decision on the basis of the belief q = 0. Therefore, the government can make a decision of the countermeasure while keeping the virtual figure of the naive government. In this sense, the government stands on the superior position to develop the defensive strategy. Thus, the strategy that the terrorist selects is as same as the one the government expects; however, the strategy that the government selects is not always same as the expectation of the terrorist. As shown in Case 1, the terrorist is surprised at the implementation of the government's countermeasure after the terror attack. The terrorist recognizes that the government took the protective countermeasure after attacking the infrastructure. It is to be noted that such an ex-post surprise can happen under the assumption of naive government.
IV. DISCLOSURE POLICY OF WARNING LEVEL (THE EXTENDED MODEL I )
A. Preliminary Settings of the Extended Model I
As well as the basic model, let us consider the situation where the government manages only one infrastructure. The government and the terrorist have common knowledge of naive government. They select their strategy on the basis of the subjective game that they expect respectively. The government forms a belief p about the terrorist's existence. Under the assumption of common knowledge of naive government, the terrorist does not know that the government forms such a belief. Meanwhile, the terrorist forms a belief of the complete success of concealment of its existence (q = 0). The government develops the disclosure policy of the belief p which reflects the government's warning level of terrorism. Let n B define the set of information that the government can disclose in the disclosure policy of warning level as follows.
The government discloses the belief p n φ : The government does not disclose (11) As a matter of convenience, it is described that the terrorist receives the information n φ when the government keep secret about the belief. It is assumed that the government can not tell a lie about the belief. That is, when the government forms the belief p, the government's strategy is to disclose the belief p or keep secret. This paper refers to such a government as honest government. It is assumed that the figure of the honest government is common knowledge between the government and the terrorist. The assumption of common knowledge of honest government implies that the terrorist trusts the information disclosed by the government beyond all doubt. Fig.3 represents the government's subjective game Γ
B G
taking into account of the disclosure strategy of the belief p. Fig.4 represents the terrorist's subjective game Γ B T (n B ). The subjective game of the terrorist is defined in response to the information that the government discloses. When the government discloses the information n p , the terrorist recognizes that the figure of the naive government is false; and thus, the terrorist revises the belief q which reflects the terrorist's expectation to the government's belief of the terrorist's existence. The terrorist restructures the expectation to their strategic relationship and reconsiders the optimal strategy for the terror attack. On the other hand, when the government discloses the information n φ , the terrorist keeps the expectation of naive government. Let q be the revised belief of the terrorist after the government discloses the belief p. Then q is defined as follows. 
Under the assumption of honest government, the above revision process about q is common knowledge between them. The government can control which subjective game the terrorist plays by changing the information the government discloses. Finally, the order of the subjective game played by the government, Γ B G , is assumed to be as follows.
ii) The terrorist's subjective game Γ B T (n φ )
Notes) The dashed area in the subjective game Γ B T (n φ ) is not played by the terrorist under the assumption of naive government (q = 0). 
B. Subjective Game Played by the Terrorist
Let us consider the case where the government does not disclose the information (n B = n φ ). This case is the same as the one in the basic model. The equilibrium of the terrorist's subjective game
Next, let us consider the case where the government discloses the information n B = n p . The terrorist notices that the initial belief q = 0 is wrong, and revises the belief to q . Under the assumption of honest government, the belief of the terrorist is revised to be q = p. Then, the optimal strategy of the terrorist is given by
The optimal government's strategy δ B * T (n p ) that the terrorist expects is given by
Let (δ
.
Consequently, if the government discloses the belief p and it is relatively low, the terrorist expects that the government does not take a countermeasure, and thus the terrorist decides to attack the infrastructure. On the other hand, in the case where the terrorist received the massage showing the government's high belief p, the terrorist expects that the government attacks with probability U −Ī r(U +D) , and the terrorist attacks the infrastructure with probability ∂p < 0 are satisfied. These results imply that the terrorist's expectation to the probability that the government takes the countermeasure does not depend on the disclosed belief p, but the probability that the terrorist decides to attack is decreasing with respect to p.
C. Subjective Game Played by the Government Γ B G
Let us induce the optimal information n B * which the government discloses. Let δ B G (n B ) be the strategy of the government, which is a function of the information n B ∈ {n p , n φ }. The government expects that the terrorist receives the information n B , revises the belief q, and makes a decision on the terror attack.
In case where the government selects the information n φ , the terrorist does not revise the belief q and selects the strategy about the terror attack. Let
) be the government's expected payoff when the government discloses the information n φ . The equilibria are induced as follows. In case where the government selects the information n p , the government expects that the terrorist revises the belief q and makes a decision on the terror attack. The terrorist's decision making which the government expects is formulated as
The optimal strategy of the government in the case of the disclosure of the belief, δ
) be the government's expected payoff when the government discloses the information n p . Then the optimal strategies and the government's expected payoff are represented as follows.
From (17), (20) the optimal information that the government discloses are induced as follows.
D. Overall Equilibria of the Extended Model I
The government and the terrorist selects their optimal strategy in accordance with each subjective game. Let Consequently, the following proposition 1 is induced. The proof is shown in appendix.
Proposition 1
Under the assumption of naive and honest government, in the case where p > c rL is satisfied, the government can increase the expected payoff by the disclosure of the belief p. In the case where p ≤ c rL , the government's disclosure of the belief p does not affect the payoff of the government.
V. DISCLOSURE POLICY ABOUT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PROTECTIVE COUNTERMEASURE (THE EXTENDED MODEL II ) A. Preliminary Settings the Extended Game II
The government develops the disclosure policy about the implementation of protective countermeasure. Let n M define the set of information that the government can disclose in the disclosure policy about the implementation of protective countermeasure as follows.
The government discloses the implementation of the protective countermeasure. n φ : The government does not disclose.
When the terrorist receives the information n 1 , the terrorist notices the virtual figure of the naive government and restructures the subjective game. As well as the extended model I, the common knowledge of honest government is assumed. It is not allowed that the government discloses the implementation of the protective countermeasure but the government actually does not take it. 
